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Abstract. For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is
crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called secu-
rity invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on
access control and information flow security strategies, this work discov-
ers and proves universal insights about security invariants. This enables
secure and convenient auto-completion of host attribute configurations.
We demonstrate our results in a civil aviation scenario. All results are
machine-verified with the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover.
1 Introduction
A distributed system, from a networking point of view, is essentially a set of
interconnected hosts. Its connectivity structure comprises an important aspect
of its overall attack surface, which can be dramatically decreased by giving each
host only the necessary access rights. Hence, it is common to protect networks
using firewalls and other forms of enforcing network level access policies. How-
ever, raw sets of such policy rules e.g., firewall rules, ACLs, or access control
matrices, scale quadratically with the number of hosts and “controlling complex-
ity is a core problem in information security” [15]. A case study, conducted in
this paper, reveals that even a policy with only 10 entities may cause difficulties
for experienced administrators. Expressive policy languages can help to reduce
the complexity. However, the question whether a policy fulfills certain security
invariants and how to express these often remains.
Security Policy
Directed Graph
G = (hosts, allowed flows)
Security Invariant
+Scenario-Specific KnowledgeHost Attribute Mapping Generic Invariant TemplateFormal HOL Semantics
Fire-
walls,
ACLs, 
etc
Fig. 1: Formal objects: Security invariant and security policy.
Using an attribute-based [21] approach, we model simple, static, positive security
policies with expressive, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) security invariants.
The formal objects, illustrated in Fig. 1, are carefully constructed for their use-
case. The policy is simply a graph, which can for example be extracted from
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2 C. Diekmann et al.
or translated to firewall rules. The security invariants are split into the formal
semantics, accessible to formal analysis, and scenario-specific knowledge, eas-
ily configurable by the end user. This model landscape enables verification of
security policies. Primarily, we contribute the following universal insights for
constructing security invariants.
1. Both provably secure and permissive default values for host attributes can
be found. This auto completion decreases the user’s configuration effort.
2. The security strategy, information flow or access control, determines whether
a security violation occurs at the sender’s or at the receiver’s side.
3. A violated invariant can always be repaired by tightening the policy if
and only if the invariant holds for the deny-all policy.
We formally introduce the underlying model in Sect. 2. Then we present three
examples of security invariant templates in Sect. 3 and conduct a formal analysis
in Sect. 4. Our implementation and a case study are presented in Sections 5 and 6.
Related work is described in Sect. 7. We conclude in Sect. 8.
2 Formal Model
We formalized all our theory in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover [20]. To stay
focused, we omit all proofs in this document but point the reader to the com-
plete formal proofs by roman reference marks. For example, when the paper
states ‘foo[iv]’, the machine-verified proof for the claim ‘foo’ can be found by
following the corresponding endnote. Note that standards such as Common Cri-
teria [7] require formal verification for their highest Evaluation Assurance Level
(EAL7) and the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover is suitable for this purpose [7,
§A.5]. Therefore, our approach is not only suitable for verification, but also a
first step towards certification.
Retaining network terminology, we will use the term host for any entity which
may appear in a policy∗, e.g., collections of IP addresses, names, or even roles.
A security policy is “a specific statement of what is and is not allowed” [5].
Narrowing its scope to network level access control, a security policy is a set of
rules which state the allowed communication relationships between hosts. It can
be represented as a directed graph.
Definition 1 (Security Policy). A security policy is a directed graph G =
(V, E), where the hosts V are a set of type V and the allowed flows E are a set
of type V×V. The type of G is abbreviated by G = (V set)× ((V×V) set).
A policy defines rules (“how?”). It does not justify the intention behind these
rules (“why?”). To reflect the why? -question, we note that depending on a con-
crete scenario, hosts may have varying security-relevant attributes. We model a
host attribute of arbitrary type Ψ and establish a total mapping from the hosts
∗In contrast to common policy terminology, we do not differentiate between subjects
and targets (objects) as they are usually indistinguishable on the network layer and a
host may act as both.
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V to their scenario-specific attribute. Security invariants can be constructed by
combining a host mapping with a security invariant template. Latter two are
defined together because the same Ψ is needed for a related host mapping and
security invariant template. Different Ψ may appear across several security in-
variants.
Definition 2 (Host Mapping and Security Invariant Template). For
scenario-specific attributes of type Ψ , a host mapping P is a total function which
maps a host to an attribute. P is of type V ⇒ Ψ .
A security invariant template m is a predicate∗ m(G, (V ⇒ Ψ)), defining the
formal semantics of a security invariant. Its first argument is a security policy,
its second argument a host attribute mapping. The predicate m(G,P ) returns
true iff the security policy G fulfills the security invariant specified by m and P .
Example 1. Label-based information flow security can be modeled with a sim-
plified version of the Bell LaPadula model [2,3]. Labels, more precisely security
clearances, are host attributes Ψ = {unclassified , confidential , secret , topsecret}.
The Bell LaPadula’s no read-up and no write-down rules can be summarized by
requiring that the security clearance of a receiver r should be greater-equal than
the security clearance of the sender s, for all (s, r) ∈ E. With a total order
‘≤’ on Ψ , the security invariant template can be defined as m((V, E), P ) ≡
∀(s, r) ∈ E. P (s) ≤ P (r).
Let the scenario-specific knowledge be that database db1 ∈ V is confidential
and all other hosts are unclassified . Using lambda calculus, the total function
P can be defined as (λh. if h = db1 then confidential else unclassified). Hence
P (db1) = confidential . For any policy G, the predicate m(G, P ) holds if db1
does not leak confidential information (i.e. there is no non-reflexive outgoing
edge from db1).
Security invariants formalize security goals. A template contributes the formal
semantics. A host mapping contains the scenario-specific knowledge. This makes
the scenario-independent semantics available for formal reasoning by treating P
and G as unknowns. Even reasoning with arbitrary security invariants is possible
by additionally treating m as unknown.
With this modeling approach, the end user needs not to be bothered with
the formalization of m, but only needs to specify G and P . In the course of this
paper, we present a convenient method for specifying P .
Security Strategies and Monotonicity. In IT security, one distinguishes be-
tween two main classes of security strategies: Access Control Strategies (ACS)
and Information Flow Strategies (IFS) [12, §6.1.4]. An IFS focuses on confiden-
∗a predicate is a total, Boolean-valued function.
4 C. Diekmann et al.
tiality and an ACS on integrity or controlled access. We require that m is in one
of these classes∗.
The two security strategies have one thing in common: they prohibit illegal
actions. From an integrity and confidentiality point of view, prohibiting more
never has a negative side effect. Removing edges from the policy cannot create
new accesses and hence cannot introduce new access control violations. Simi-
larly, for an IFS, by statically prohibiting flows in the network, no new direct
information leaks nor new side channels can be created. In brief, prohibiting
more does not harm security. From this, it follows that if a policy (V, E) fulfills
its security invariant, for a stricter policy rule set E′ ⊆ E, the policy (V, E′)
must also fulfill the security invariant. We call this property monotonicity.
Composition of Security Invariants. Usually, there is more than one security
invariant for a given scenario. However, composition and modularity is often
a non-trivial problem. For example, access control lists that are individually
secure can introduce security breaches under composition [13]. Also, information
flow security of individually secure processes, systems, and networks may be
subverted by composition [19]. This is known as the composition problem [2].
With the formalization in this paper, composability and modularity are en-
abled by design. For a fixed policy G with k security invariants, let mi be the
security invariant template and P i the host mapping, for i ∈ {1 . . . k}. The pred-
icate mi(G, Pi) holds if and only if the security invariant i holds for the policy G.
With this modularity, composition of all security invariants is straightforward[i]:
all security invariants must be fulfilled. The monotonicity guarantees that having
more security invariants provides greater or equal security.
m1(G, P1) ∧ · · · ∧mk(G, Pk)
3 Examples of Security Invariant Templates
In this section, we present three examples of security invariant templates. Our
implementation currently features more than ten templates and grows. All can
be inspected in the published theory files. Common networking scenarios such
as subnets, non-interference invariants, or access control lists are available. With
the following templates, a larger case study is presented in Section 6.
Simplified Bell LaPadula with Trust. A simplified version of the Bell La-
Padula model is already outlined in Example 1. In this paragraph, we extend
this model with a notion of trust by adding a Boolean flag trust to the host at-
tributes. For a host v, let P (v).sc denote v’s security clearance and P (v).trust if
∗By limiting m to IFS or ACS, we emphasize that availability is not in the scope
of this work. Availability requires reasoning on a lower abstraction level, for example,
to incorporate network hardware failure. Availability invariants could be expressed
similarly, but would require inverse monotonicity (see below).
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v is trusted. A trusted host can receive information of any security clearance and
may declassify it, i.e. distribute the information with its own security clearance.
For example, a trusted host is allowed to receive any information and with the
unclassified clearance, it is allowed to reveal it to anyone. The template is thus
formalized as follows.
m
(
(V,E), P
) ≡ ∀(s, r) ∈ E. {True if P (r).trust
P (s).sc ≤ P (r).sc otherwise
Domain Hierarchy. The domain hierarchy template mirrors hierarchical ac-
cess control structures. It is best introduced by example. The tiny car company
Alice
Carol
Dan
Erin
Frank
Gabby
Hans
git! git!
Bob!
backup
cc
e.cc s.cc
br.e.cc wh.e.cc
1 2
cc
whbr
e s
Fig. 2a (top): Organiza-
tional structure of cc.
Fig. 2b (left): Policy and
host mapping of cc.
(cc) consists of the two sub-departments engineering (e) and sales (s). The
engineering department itself consists of the brakes (br) and the wheels (wh)
department. This tree-like organizational structure is illustrated in Fig. 2a. We
denote a position by the fully qualified domain name, e.g., wh.e.cc uniquely
identifies the wheels department. Let ‘v’ denote the ‘is below or at the same hi-
erarchy level ’ relation, e.g., wh.e.cc v wh.e.cc, wh.e.cc v e.cc, and wh.e.cc v cc.
However, wh.e.cc 6v br .e.cc and br .e.cc 6v wh.e.cc. The ‘v’ relation denotes a
partial order[ii]. The company’s command structures are strictly hierarchical, i.e.
commands are either exchanged in the same department or travel from higher
departments to their sub-departments. Formally, the receiver’s level v sender’s
level. For a host v, let P (v).level map to the fully qualified domain name of v’s
department. For example in Fig. 2b, P (Bob).level = e.cc.
As in many real-world applications of a mathematical model, exceptions exist.
Those are depicted by exclamation marks in Fig. 2b. For example, Bob as head of
engineering is in a trusted position. This means he can operate as if he were in the
position of Alice. This implies that he can communicate on par with Alice, which
also implies that he might send commands to the sales department. We model
such exceptions by assigning each host a trust level. This trust level specifies up
to which position in the hierarchy this host may act. For example, Bob in e.cc
with a trust level of 1 can act as if he were in cc, which means he has the same
command power as Alice. Let P (v).trust map to v’s trust level. We implement
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a function chop(level : DomainName, trust : N) ⇒ DomainName which chops
off trust sub-domains from a domain name, e.g., chop(br .e.cc, 1) = e.cc. With
this, the security invariant template can be formalized as follows.
m
(
(V,E), P
) ≡ ∀(s, r) ∈ E. P (r).level v chop(P (s).level , P (s).trust)
Security Gateway. Hosts may belong to a certain domain. Sometimes, a pat-
tern where intra-domain communication between domain members must be ap-
proved by a central instance is required. As an example, let several virtual ma-
chines belong to the same domain and a secure hypervisor manage intra-domain
communication. As another example, inter-device communication of slave de-
vices in the same domain is controlled by a central master device. We call such a
central instance ‘security gateway’ and present a template for this architecture.
Four host roles are distinguished: A security gateway (sgw), a security gateway
accessible from the outside (sgwa), a domain member (memb), and a default
value that reflects ‘none of these roles’ (default). The following table implements
the access control restrictions. The role of the sender (snd), role of the receiver
(rcv), the result (rslt), and an explanation are given.
snd rcv rslt explanation
sgw * 3 Can send to the world.
sgwa * 3 — “—
memb sgw 3 Can contact its security gateway.
memb sgwa 3 — “—
memb memb 7 Must not communicate directly. May communicate via sgw(a).
memb default 3 No restrictions for direct access to outside world. Outgoing ac-
cesses are not within the invariant’s scope.
default sgw 7 Not accessible from outside.
default sgwa 3 Accessible from outside.
default memb 7 Protected from outside world.
default default 3 No restrictions.
This template is minimalistic in that it only restricts accesses to members
(from other members or the outside world), whereas accesses from members to
the outside world are unrestricted. It can be implemented by a simple table
lookup. In-host communication is allowed by adding s 6= r.
m
(
(V,E), P
) ≡ ∀(s, r) ∈ E, s 6= r. table(P (s), P (r))
4 Generic Semantic Analysis of Security Invariants
Offending Flows. Since m is monotonic, if an IFS or ACS security invariant
is violated, there must be some flows in G that are responsible for the violation.
By removing them, the security invariant should be fulfilled (if possible). We
Verifying Security Policies using Host Attributes 7
call a minimal set of such flows the offending flows. Minimality is expressed by
requiring that every single flow in the offending flows bears responsibility for the
security invariant’s violation.
Definition 3 (Set of Offending Flows).
set offending flows
(
G, P
)
=
{
F ⊆ E | ¬m(G, P ) ∧ m((V, E \ F ), P ) ∧
∀(s, r) ∈ F. ¬m((V, (E \ F ) ∪ {(s, r)}) , P )}
Example 2. The definition does not require that the offending flows are uniquely
defined. This is reflected in its type since it is a set of sets. For example, for
G = ({v1, v2, v3}, {(v1, v2), (v2, v3)}) and a security invariant that v1 must not
transitively access v3, the invariant is violated: v2 could forward requests. The
set of offending flows is {{(v1, v2)}, {(v2, v3)}}. This ambiguity tells the end user
that there are multiple options to fix a violated security invariant. The policy
can be tightened by prohibiting one of the offending flows, e.g.,{(v1, v2)}.
If m(G, P ) holds, the set of offending flows is always empty[iii]. Also, for every
element in the set of offending flows, it is guaranteed that prohibiting these
flows leads to a fulfilled security invariant[iv]. It is not guaranteed that the set of
offending flows is always non-empty for a violated security invariant. Depending
on m, it may be possible that no set of flows satisfies Def. 3. However, Theorem 1
proves[v] an important insight: a violated invariant can always be repaired by
tightening the policy if and only if the invariant holds for the deny-all policy.
Theorem 1 (No Edges Validity). For m monotonic, arbitrary V, E, and P,
let G = (V, E) and Gdeny-all = (V, ∅). If ¬m(G,P ) then
m
(
Gdeny-all , P
)←→ set offending flows(G, P ) 6= ∅
We demand that all security invariants fulfill m
(
Gdeny-all , P
)
. This means that
violations are always fixable.
We call a host responsible for a security violation the offending host. Given
one offending flow, the violation either happens at the sender’s or the receiver’s
side. The following difference between ACS and IFS invariant can be observed.
If m is an ACS, the host that initiated the request provokes the violation by
violating an access control restriction. If m is an IFS, the information leak only
occurs when the information reaches the unintended receiver. This distinction is
essential as it renders the upcoming Def. 5 and 6 provable.
Definition 4 (Offending Hosts). For F ∈ set offending flows(G,P )
offenders(F ) =
{
{ s | (s, r) ∈ F} if ACS
{ r | (s, r) ∈ F} if IFS
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Secure Auto Completion of Host Mappings. Since P is a total function
V ⇒ Ψ , a host mapping for every element of V must be provided. However, an
end user might only specify the security-relevant host attributes. Let PC ⊆ V×Ψ
be a finite, possibly incomplete host attribute mapping specified by the end
user. For some ⊥ ∈ Ψ , the total function P can be constructed by P (v) ≡
(if (v, ψ) ∈ PC then ψ else ⊥). Intuitively, if no host attribute is specified by
the user, ⊥ acts as a default attribute.
Given the user specified all security-relevant attributes, we observe that the
default attribute can never solve an existing security violation. Therefore, we
conclude that for a given security invariant m, a value ⊥ can securely be used as
a default attribute if it cannot mask potential security risks. In other words, a
default attribute ⊥ is secure w.r.t. the given information P if for all offenders v,
replacing v’s attribute∗ by⊥, denoted by Pv 7→⊥, has the same amount of security-
relevant information as the original P .
Definition 5 (Secure Default Attribute). A ⊥ is a secure default attribute
iff for a fixed m and for arbitrary G and P that cause a security violation, re-
placing the host attribute of any offenders by ⊥ must guarantee that no security-
relevant information is masked.
∀ G P. ∀ F ∈ set offending flows(G,P ). ∀v ∈ offenders(F ). ¬m(G,Pv 7→⊥)
Example 3. In the simple Bell LaPadula model, an IFS, let us assume informa-
tion is leaked. The predicate ‘information leaks’ holds, no matter to which lower
security clearance the information is leaked. In general, if there is an illegal flow,
it is from a higher security clearance at the sender to a lower security clearance
at the receiver. Replacing the security clearance of the receiver with the lowest
security clearance, the information about the security violation is always pre-
served. Thus, unclassified is the secure default attribute[vi]. In summary, if all
classified hosts are labeled correctly, treating the rest as unclassified prevents
information leakage.
To elaborate on Def. 5, it can be restated as follows. It focuses on the available
security-relevant information in the case of a security violation. The attribute
of an offending host v bears no information, except for the fact that there is a
violation. A secure default attribute ⊥ cannot solve security violations. Hence
P (v) and ⊥ are equal w.r.t. the security violation. Thus, P and Pv 7→⊥ must be
equal w.r.t. the information about the security violation. Requiring this property
for all policies, all possible security violations, all possible choices of offending
flows, and all candidates of offending hosts, this definition justifies that ⊥ never
hides a security problem.
Example 4. Definition 5 can be specialized to the exemplary case in which a new
host x is added to a policy G without updating the host mapping. Consulting an
oracle, x’s real host attribute is P (x) = ψ. In reality, the oracle is not available
and x is mapped to ⊥ because it is new and unknown. Let x be an attacker.
∗Pv 7→⊥ ≡ (λx. if x = v then ⊥ else P (x)), an updated P which returns ⊥ for v
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With the oracle’s ψ-attribute, x causes a security violation. We demand that
the security violation is exposed even without the knowledge from the oracle.
Definition 5 satisfies this demand: if x mapped by the oracle to ψ causes a
security violation, x mapped to ⊥ does not mask the security violation.
A ‘deny-all’ default attribute is easily proven secure. Definition 5 reads the fol-
lowing for this case: if an offender v does something that violates m(G,P ), then
removing all of v’s rights (Pv 7→deny-all), a violation must persist. Hence, design-
ing whitelisting security invariant templates with a restrictive default attribute is
simple. However, to add to the ease-of-use, more permissive default attributes are
often desirable since they reduce the manual configuration effort. In particular,
if a security invariant only concerns a subset of a policy’s hosts, no restrictions
should be imposed on the rest of the policy. This is also possible with Def. 5,
but may require a comparably difficult proof.
Example 5. In Example 1, no matter how many hosts are added to the policy,
it is sufficient to only specify that db1 is confidential . This confidentiality is
guaranteed while no restrictions are put on hosts that do not interact with db1.
Definition 6 (Default Attribute Uniqueness). A default attribute ⊥ is
called unique iff it is secure (Def. 5) and there is no ⊥′ 6= ⊥ s.t. ⊥′ is secure.
We demand that all security invariants fulfill Def. 6. This means that there is
only one unique secure default attribute ⊥.
Example 6. In the simple Bell LaPadula model, since the security clearances
form a total order, the lowest security clearance is uniquely defined.
With the experience of proving Def. 5 and 6 for default attributes for 18 invari-
ant templates, the connection between offending host and security strategy was
discovered. During our early research, we realized that a Boolean variable, fixed
for m, indicating the offending host was necessary to make Def. 5 and 6 provable.
A classification of the different invariants revealed the important connection.
Default Attributes of Section 3’s Templates. In the Bell LaPadula with
Trust template, the default attribute is (unclassified , untrusted)[vii]. In the Do-
main Hierarchy, it is[viii] a special value ⊥ with a trust of zero and which is at
the lowest point in the hierarchy, i.e. ∀ l. ⊥ v l. Finally, it is worth mentioning
that the v-relation forms a lattice[ix], which is a desirable structure for security
classes [10]. In the Security Gateway, the default attribute is default [x].
All default attributes allow flows between each other. This greatly adds to
the ease-of-use, since the scope of an invariant is limited only to the explicitly
configured hosts. The unconcerned parts of a security policy are not negatively
affected.
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Unique and Efficient Offending Flows. All security invariant templates pre-
sented in Section 3 have a simple, common structure: a predicate is evaluated for
all flows. Let Φ(Ψ, Ψ) be this predicate. Note that all invariants of this structure
fulfill monotonicity[xi].
Since Def. 3 is defined over all subsets, the naive computational complexity
of is in NP . This section shows that – with knowledge about a concrete security
invariant template m – it can be computed in linear time. For Φ-structured
invariants, the offending flows are always uniquely defined and can be described
intuitively[xii]∗.
Theorem 2 (Φ Set of Offending Flows). If m is Φ-structured m(G,P ) ≡
∀(s, r) ∈ E. Φ(P (s), P (r)), then
set offending flows
(
G, P
)
=
{
{{(s, r) ∈ E | ¬ Φ(P (s), P (r))}} if ¬ m(G, P )
∅ if m(G, P )
Example 7. For the Bell LaPadula model, if no security violation exists the set
of offending flows is ∅, else {{(s, r) ∈ E | P (s) > P (r)}}[xiv].
Policy Construction. A policy that fulfills all security invariants can be
constructed by removing all offending flows from the allow-all policy Gall =
(V, V×V ). This approach is sound[xv] for arbitrary m and even complete[xvi] for
Φ-structured security invariant templates.
Example 8. If completely contradictory security invariants are given, the result-
ing (maximum) policy is the deny-all policy Gdeny-all = (V, ∅).
5 Implementation
We built a tool called topoS with all the features presented in this paper. Its
core reasoning logic consists of code generated by Isabelle/HOL. This guarantees
the correctness of all results computed by topoS’s core [16].
Computational Complexity. topoS performs linear in the number of security
invariants and quadratic in the number of hosts for Φ-structured invariants.
For scenarios with less than 100 hosts, it responds interactively in less than 10
seconds. A benchmark of the automated policy construction, the most expensive
algorithm, is presented in Fig. 3. For |V | hosts, |V |2/4 flows were created. With
reasonable memory consumption, policies with up to 250k flows can be processed
in less than half an hour. topoS contains a lot of machine generated code that is
not optimized for performance but correctness. However, the overall theoretical
and practical performance is sufficient for real-world usage. During our work
with Airbus Group, we never encountered any performance issues.
∗The same holds for templates with a structure similar to the Security Gateway[xiii]
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Fig. 3: Runtime of the policy construc-
tion algorithm for 100 Φ-structured
invariants on an i7-2620M CPU
(2.70GHz), Java Virtual Machine. X-
axis: |V |, Y-axis: runtime in minutes.
Section 6 User Case Study: Statistics
Valid Violations Missing
16.0/15.8/1.7 1.0/3.2/4.4 5.0/5.6/2.1
14.0/14.0/1.4 1.0/1.6/1.9 7.0/7.4/1.0
12.0/10.6/5.7 4.0/6.6/4.9 11.0/11.2/6.2
median/arithmetic mean/std deviation
Table 1: Statistics on Section 6’s user-
designed policies. Number of valid, vi-
olating, and missing flows. User experi-
ences (top to bottom): Expert, Interme-
diate, Novice. Five participants each.
6 Case Study: A Cabin Data Network
In this section, we present a slightly more complex scenario: a policy for a cabin
data network for the general civil aviation. This example was chosen as security
is very important in this domain and it provides a challenging interaction of
different security invariants. It is a small imaginary toy example, developed in
collaboration with Airbus Group. To make it self-contained and accessible to
readers without aeronautical background knowledge, it does not obey aeronau-
tical standards. However, the scenario is plausible, i.e. a real-world scenario may
be similar. During our research, we also evaluated real world scenarios in this do-
main. With this experience, we try to present a small, simplified, self-contained,
plausible toy scenario that, however, preserves many real world snares.
To estimate the scenario’s complexity, we asked 15 network professionals to
design its policy. On the one hand, as many use cases as possible should be ful-
filled, on the other hand, no security violation must occur. Therefore, the task
was to maximize the allowed flows without violating any security invariant. The
results are illustrated in Table 1. Surprisingly, even expert network administra-
tors made errors (both missing flows and security violations) when designing the
policy.
A detailed scenario description, the host attribute mappings, and raw data
are available in [11]. Using this reference, we also encourage the active reader
to design the policy by oneself before it is revealed in Fig. 4b. The scenario is
presented in the following compressed two paragraphs.
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The network consists of the following hosts.
CC The Cabin Core Server, a server that
controls essential aircraft features, such
as air conditioning and the wireless and
wired telecommunication of the crew.
C1, C2 Two mobile devices for the crew
to help them organize, e.g., communi-
cate, make announcements.
Wifi A wifi hotspot that allows passen-
gers to access the Internet with their own
devices. Explicitly listed as it might also
be responsible for billing passenger’s In-
ternet access.
IFEsrv The In-Flight Entertainment
server with movies, Internet access, etc.
Master of the IFE displays.
IFE1, IFE2 Two In-Flight Entertain-
ment displays, mounted at the back of
passenger seats. They provide movies and
Internet access. Thin clients, everything
is streamed from the IFE server.
P1, P2 Two passenger-owned devices,
e.g., laptops, smartphones.
Sat A satellite uplink to the Internet.
SAT
IFEsrv
declassify 
sgwa
entertain.aircraft POD
INET
crew.aircraft
IFE2confid. 
memb
IFE1confid. 
memb
CCsecret
! 
C1
secret
C2
secret WiFi
!
P1 P2
INETPOD
aircraft
crewentertain
Fig. 4a (top): Security
domains of the cabin
data network.
Fig. 4b (left): Cabin net-
work policy and hosts’
attributes.
The following three security invariants are specified.
Security Invariant 1, Domain Hierarchy. Four different security domains exist
in the aircraft, c.f. Fig. 4a. They separate the crew domain, the entertainment do-
main, the passenger-owned devices (POD) domain and the Internet (INET) domain.
In Fig. 4b, the host domain mapping is illustrated and trusted devices are marked
with an exclamation mark.
The CC may send to the entertain domain, hence it is trusted. Possible use cases:
Stewards coordinate food distribution; Announcement from the crew is send to the
In-Flight Entertainment system (via CC) and distributed there to the IFE displays.
The Wifi is located in the POD domain to be reachable by PODs. It is trusted to
send to the entertain domain. Possible use case: Passenger subscribes a film from the
IFE server to her notebook or establishes connections to the Internet.
In the INET domain, the SAT is isolated to prevent accesses from the Internet into
the aircraft.
Security Invariant 2, Security Gateway. The IFE displays are thin clients and
strictly bound to their server. Peer to peer communication is prohibited. The Security
Gateway model directly provides the respective access control restrictions.
Security Invariant 3, Bell LaPadula with Trust. Invariant 3 defines information
flow restrictions by labeling confidential information sources. To protect the passen-
ger’s privacy when using the IFE displays, it is undesirable that the IFE displays
communicate with anyone, except for the IFEsrv. Therefore, the IFE displays are
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marked as confidential (confid.). The IFEsrv is considered a central trusted device.
To enable passengers to surf the Internet on the IFE displays by forwarding the pack-
ets to the Internet or forward announcements from the crew, it must be allowed to
declassify any information to the default (i.e. unclassified) security clearance. Finally,
the crew communication is considered more critical than the convenience features,
therefore, CC, C1, and C2 are considered secret. As the IFEsrv is trusted, it can
receive and forward announcements from the crew.
This case study illustrates that this complex scenario can be divided into three
security invariants that can be represented with the help of the previously pre-
sented templates. Figure 4b also reveals that very few host attributes must be
manually specified; the automatically added secure default attributes are not
shown. All security invariants are fulfilled.
The automated policy construction yields the following results. The solid
edges unified with the dashed edges∗ result in the uniquely defined policy with
the maximum number of allowed flows. The solid lines were given by the policy,
the dashed lines were calculated from the invariants. These ‘diffs’ are computed
and visualized automatically by topoS. They provide the end user with helpful
feedback regarding ‘what do my invariants require? ’ vs. ‘what does my policy
specify? ’. This results in a feedback loop we used extensively during our research
to refine the policy and the invariants. It provides a ‘feeling’ for the invariants.
The main evaluation of this work are the formal correctness proofs. However,
we also presented topoS to the 15 users and asked them to personally judge
topoS’s utility. It was considered downright helpful and a majority would want
to use it for similar tasks. The graphical feedback was also much appreciated.
7 Related Work
In a field study with 38 participants, Hamed and Al-Shaer discovered that “even
expert administrators can make serious mistakes when configuring the network
security policy” [17]. Our user feedback session extends this finding as we discov-
ered that even expert administrators can make serious mistakes when designing
the network security policy.
In their inspiring work, Guttman and Herzog [15] describe a formal mod-
eling approach for network security management. They suggest algorithms to
verify whether configurations of firewalls and IPsec gateways fulfill certain secu-
rity goals. These comparatively low-level security goals may state that a certain
packet’s path only passes certain areas or that packets between two networked
hosts are protected by IPsec’s ESP confidentiality header. This allows reason-
ing on a lower abstraction level at the cost of higher manual specification and
configuration effort. Header space analysis [18] allows checking static network
invariants such as no-forwarding-loops or traffic-isolation on the forwarding and
middleboxes plane. It provides a common, protocol-agnostic framework and al-
gebra on the packet header bits.
∗unified with all reflexive edges, i.e. in-host communication
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Firmato [1] was designed to ease management of firewalls. A firewall-indepen-
dent entity relationship model is used to specify the security policy. With the help
of a model compiler, such a model can be translated to firewall configurations.
Ethane [6] is a link layer security architecture which evolved to the network
operating system NOX [14]. They implement high-level security policies and
propose a secure binding from host names to network addresses. In the long
term, we consider topoS a valuable add-on on top of such systems for policy
verification. For example, it could warn the administrator that a recent network
policy change violates a security invariant, maybe defined years ago.
Expressive policy specification languages, such as Ponder [9], were proposed.
Positive authorization policies (only a small aspect of Ponder) are roughly com-
parable to our policy graph. The authors note that e.g., negative authorization
policies (deny-rules) can create conflicts. Policy constraints can be checked at
compile time. In [4], a policy specification language (SPSL) with allow and deny
policy rules is presented. With this, a conflict-free policy specification is con-
structed. Conflict-free Boolean formulas of this policy description and the policy
implementation in the security mechanisms (router ACL entries) are checked for
equality using a SAT solver. One unique feature covered is hidden service access
paths, e.g., http might be prohibited in zone1 but zone1 can ssh to zone2 where
http is allowed. [8] focuses on policies in dynamic systems and their analysis.
These papers require specification of the verification goals and security goals
and can thus benefit from our contributions.
This work’s modeling concept is very similar to the Attribute Based Access
Control (ABAC) model [21], though the underlying formal objects differ. ABAC
distinguishes subjects, resources, and environments. Attributes may be assigned
to each of these entities, similar to our host mappings. The ABAC policy model
consists of positive rules which grant access based on the assigned attributes,
comparably to security invariant templates. Therefore, our insights and contri-
butions are also applicable to the ABAC model.
8 Conclusion
After more than 50k changed lines of formal theory, our simple, yet powerful,
model landscape emerged. Representing policies as graphs makes them visualiz-
able. Describing security invariants as total Boolean-valued functions is both ex-
pressive and accessible to formal analysis. Representing host mappings as partial
configurations is end-user-friendly, transforming them to total functions makes
them handy for the design of templates. With this simple model, we discovered
important universal insights on security invariants. In particular, the transforma-
tion of host mappings and a simple sanity check which guarantees that security
policy violations can always be resolved. This provides deep insights about how
to express verification goals. The full formalization in the Isabelle/HOL theorem
prover provides high confidence in the correctness.
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Definitions, Lemmata, and Theorems
[i]all-security-requirements-fulfilled [ii]instantiation domainNameDept :: order
[iii]validmodel-imp-no-offending [iv]remove-offending-flows-imp-model-valid [v]valid-
empty-edges-iff-exists-offending-flows [vi]interpretation BLPbasic: NetworkModel
[vii]interpretation BLPtrusted: NetworkModel [viii]interpretation DomainHierar-
chyNG: NetworkModel [ix]instantiation domainName :: lattice [x]interpretation
SecurityGatewayExtended-simplified: NetworkModel [xi]monotonicity-eval-model-
mono [xii]ENF-offending-set [xiii]ENFnr-offending-set [xiv]BLP-offending-set
[xv]generate-valid-topology-sound [xvi]generate-valid-topology-max-topo
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the host attribute mappings of Section 6’s case
study.
Domain Hierarchy
CC 7→ (level : crew .aircraft , trust : 1)
C1 7→ (level : crew .aircraft , trust : 0)
C2 7→ (level : crew .aircraft , trust : 0)
IFEsrv 7→ (level : entertain.aircraft , trust : 0)
IFE1 7→ (level : entertain.aircraft , trust : 0)
IFE2 7→ (level : entertain.aircraft , trust : 0)
SAT 7→ (level : INET .entertain.aircraft , trust : 0)
Wifi 7→ (level : POD .entertain.aircraft , trust : 1)
P1 7→ (level : POD .entertain.aircraft , trust : 0)
P2 7→ (level : POD .entertain.aircraft , trust : 0)
Security Gateway
IFEsrv 7→ sgwa
IFE1 7→ memb
IFE2 7→ memb
Simplified Bell LaPadula with Trust
CC 7→ (sc : secret , trust : False)
C1 7→ (sc : secret , trust : False)
C2 7→ (sc : secret trust : False)
IFE1 7→ (sc : confidential , trust : False)
IFE2 7→ (sc : confidential , trust : False)
IFEsrv 7→ (sc : unclassified , trust : True)
